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MANAGEABILITY OF CLASS ACTIONS UNDER
S. 3475: CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE
POLICY CHOICES REVEALED IN RULE
23(b)(3) LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
On August 25, 1978, Senators DeConcini and Kennedy
introduced Senate Bill 34751 in the United States Senate. 2 This
bill is designed to improve class action practice by replacing
present Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 3 which de-
scribes the procedures for maintaining a class action on the
basis of common questions of law or fact among class mem-
bers.' The stated purpose of the bill is to create new procedures
which "lessen the severe problems of cost and management
which have created thousands of pages of overly-complex, con-
tradictory precedent."'5 It is the culmination6 of a Department
I S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (1978).
2 124 CONG. REc. 14501 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). S.
3475 has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Judicial Improve-
ments. No action was taken before the end of the last session of Congress and no similar
bills have been introduced in this session. See Letter from Sen. Walter D. Huddleston,
United States Senate, to KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL (June 5, 1979) (on file in KENTUcKY
LAW JouRNAL office).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (amended 1966).
The present version of 23(b)(3) requires:
[that] the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individ-
ual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters perti-
nent to the finding include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B)
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or unde-
sirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (amended 1966).
2 124 CONG. REC. 14502 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978) (Bill commentary).
In June of 1977 the Justice Department mailed to 250 members of the bar a
discussion memorandum cataloguing difficulties with present practice and possible
solutions. In addition, a questionnaire was circulated to 1800 judges, practitioners and
legal scholars. In December 1977, a draft statute was circulated and reprinted in 841
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of Justice effort to realize the Carter Administration's commit-
ment to facilitate responsible use of the class action device.
7
Actually, the bill reflects a legislative attempt to circum-
vent limits recently placed on 23(b)(3) class actions by the
courts. The Supreme Court has limited class action access to
the federal judiciary by refusing to aggregate individual dam-
ages to meet the federal jurisdictional amount. Also, the Court
has imposed requirements on class representatives, such as
individual notice to class members,9 which have seriously im-
paired the usefulness of 23(b)(3) actions. These limitations
have had particular impact on consumer class suits, where the
individual claims are typically small and widespread and indi-
vidual relief is not practical.10 This bill would reopen the fed-
eral courts to such suits and would provide clearer procedural
devices for management of all class action litigation.
Senate Bill 3475 is indeed a comprehensive response to the
problems inherent in class action lawsuits. Although some of
the bill's provisions are simple and straightforward," this com-
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-1 (Dec. 8, 1977). The present version of the
bill was produced after analysis of the commentary sent in response to that draft. 124
CONG. REc., supra note 5, at 14502.
Comments of President Carter, Vice President Mondale, and Attorney General
Griffin Bell referring to this commitment are noted in 124 CONG. Rac., supra note 5,
at 14502.
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332 (1969). The required jurisdictional minimum is $10,000 for both diversity and
federal question jurisdiction in district courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1332(a).
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
124 CONG. Rlc., supra note 5, at 14502; Note, To Right Mass Wrongs: A Federal
Consumer Class Action Act, 13 HiAv. J. LEis. 776, 786-92 (1976).
11 E.g., S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3001(b) (1978) and S.
3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. B, § 3011 (b) provide that federal jurisdic-
tion is expressly granted so that jurisdictional amount is no barrier. Similarly, the
prerequisites for bringing a class action are greatly simplified when compared to the
vague certification requirements of Rule 23. See generally, Simon, Class Ac-
tions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 379-80 (1973) and Note,
The Cy Pres Solution to the Damage Distribution Problems of Mass Class Actions, 9
GA. L. REv. 893, 899-900 (1975), for criticism of the ambiguity of Rule 23 prerequisites
for certification of class actions. For example, compare FD. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)
(amended 1966) (class too numerous for joinder) with S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
sec. 2(a), subch. A § 3001(a)(1) (200 or more persons) and S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
sec. 2(a), subch. B, § 3011(a)(1) (40 or more persons); compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)
(amended 1966) (common questions must predominate over individual questions) with
S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3001(a)(4) and S. 3475, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. B, § 3011(a)(3) (action must present a substantial common
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ment will analyze the more complex manageability provisions
of the legislation by: 1) outlining the structure of the bill; 2)
identifying the management problems addressed by the bill; 3)
discussing the theoretical approach of the solutions offered by
the bill; and 4) outlining the concrete management devices in
the bill.
I. STRUCTURE OF SENATE BIL 3475
Proper understanding of the manageability issues necessi-
tates a brief outline of the bill's structure. The bill is divided
into three subchapters.' 2 Each of the first two subchapters de-
scribes a different class action device,' 3 and the third offers
tools for judicial management of either of the actions described
in the first two subchapters. 4 Essentially, these two class ac-
tion devices split the present Federal Rule 23(b)(3) actions on
the basis of the size of the class and the individual claims, and
provide separate procedures which are sensitive to the require-
ments of the particular action involved. 5
A. Subchapter A: The "Public Action"
Subchapter A of the bill describes the public action.'" In
a public action a "person whose conduct in the manufacture,
rental, distribution, or sale of realty, goods, or services, includ-
ing securities, gives rise to. a civil private right of action for
damages" pursuant to a federal statute is also liable to the
United States.'7 The prerequisites to such an action are that
the unlawful conduct injure 200 or more persons,' 8 in an
question of law or fact); compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) (amended 1966) (claims or
defense of the representative must be typical of those of the class) with S. 3475, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A. § 3001(a)(3) and S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. Sec.
2(a), subch. B. § 3011(a)(2) (injuries of the class members must arise from the same
transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences).
32 124 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at 14503.
13 Id.
14 Id.
Id. at 14502-03.
S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A (1978); 124 CONG. REc., supra
note 5, at 14503.
S 5. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess, Sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3001(a) (1978).
Id. § 3001(a)(1).
[Vol. 68
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amount less than $300 each, 9 which aggregates to a sum in
excess of $60,000.0 The injuries must arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occur-
rences,"1 and present "a substantial question of law or fact
common to the injured persons.
12
Clearly, a public action contemplates small, widespread
injuries in the consumer context.2 3 Although the action may be
initiated by an injured class member (a relator) or the United
States Attorney General, a public action must be brought in
the name of the United States.2 4 The Attorney General may
assume control of the action and decide whether it will be
prosecuted and who will prosecute it.26 Essentially, the indi-
vidual class members have no vested interest in the action until
the defendant's liability is determined and damages are dis-
tributed.
2 7
B. Subchapter B: The "Class Compensatory Action"
The second subchapter creates the class compensatory
action in which liability is based on the violation of a federal
statute which gives rise to a private cause of action for dam-
ages.29 This subchapter provides for a defendant or a plaintiff
class action." The compensatory action contemplates a class
I d.
20 Id. § 3001(a)(2).
22 Id. § 3001(a)(3).
'Id. § 3001(a)(4).
21 124 CONG. REC., supra note 5, at 14503.
24 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3001(c).
Id. § 3002(b)(4).
26 Id. § 3002(b)(2)-(3).
" 124 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at 14505.
25 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. B (1978); 124 CONG. REC., supra
note 5, at 14506.
S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. B, § 3011(a) (1978).
" Id. For materials which focus exclusively on the issues associated with defen-
dant class actions, see generally Wolfson, Defendant Class Actions, 38 OHIo ST. L.J.
459 (1977); Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1978).
For an example of a defendant class action, see Technograph Printed Circuits,
Ltd. v. Method Elec., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968). This case involved the
successful attempt of two corporate plaintiffs to qualify four actions filed in this dis-
trict as a class action under amended Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The cause of action for these
suits was patent infringement. Over 70 actions were filed by these plaintiffs in 18
federal district courts and the Court of Claims against other defendants for infringe-
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containing forty or more persons3' whose individual injuries or
liabilities exceed $300.32 Like the public action, the injuries or
liabilities must arise from the same transaction or occurrence
or series of transactions or occurrences, 3  and a substantial
common question of law or fact must be presented. 4
A class compensatory action is similar to a Rule 23(b)(3)
action. The liability in such an action is on the defendant class,
or recovery is given to the plaintiff class, and not to the United
States.35 Consequently, control of the litigation rests primarily
on the class representative and his attorney.
C. Subchapter C: Judicial Management
Subchapter C outlines the tools available to courts to man-
age the litigation process in either type of aforementioned ac-
tion .3 These management tools are designed to ease the burden
of class action suits on the federal judiciary and facilitate
speedier resolution of procedural and substantive issues. This
subchapter provides unambiguous standards for determining
adequacy of representation by the class representative and his
attorney 38 and for calculating reasonable attorney's fees. 9 It
ment of the same patents. The court discussed each of the requirements of Rule 23
and decided that a defendant class action was proper in this litigation.
11 Id. § 3011(a)(1).
32 Id.
1 Id. § 3011(a)(2).
11 Id. § 3011(a)(3).
3, 124 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at 14506.
31 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. C (1978).
31 124 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at 14503.
1 Section 3022 of the bill outlines the procedures a court must follow to determine
adequacy of counsel and class representatives in a public action or class compensatory
action:
(a) In considering the adequacy of counsel for the relator to represent
the interests of the United States in a public action prosecuted by a relator
or the adequacy of the representative party and of his counsel to represent
absent persons included within the class in a class compensatory action the
court, without oral or written argument or motion by the parties, shall re-
quire counsel to file affidavits stating-
(1) the extent of counsel's experience with public actions and class or
complex litigation;
(2) the extent to which a party in a class compensatory action has
interests common to those of the class or fundamental interests antagonistic
to those of the class; and
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(3) any other information requested by the court.
In a class compensatory action the representative party or parties shall also
be required to file affidavits setting forth the information in paragraphs (2)
and (3).
(b) After reviewing the affidavits submitted under subsection (a) the
court may request oral or written argument or motion by the parties before
making its determination regarding adequacy of representation.
31 Section 3027 provides for an award of attorney's fees if such an award is other-
wise allowed by law, and is ordered to be paid out of a settlement or judgment fund,
or by a party in a public action or class compensatory action.
Section 3027(a) outlines the basic formula for determining the time spent by the
attorney on the action. This formula is based on the time spent on the action by the
attorney, paralegal and administrative personnel found by the court to have been
reasonably spent on the action. Time spent on the issue of attorney's fees and on the
administration of a judgment or settlement fund is included. Alterations in this basic
formula provide that:
(1) the court shall disallow hours found unnecessary, or unrelated to
the action, or to involve duplication of activity, and shall state in writing its
reasons for disallowance; and
(2) the court shall allocate hours to administrative personnel rather
than counsel where the court finds that work performed by counsel could
have been assigned to such personnel.
After the formula in § 3027(a) is used and the number of hours spent on the action
is determined and allocated between counsel and administrative personnel, the §
3027(b) formula is applied to determine the hourly rate at which such time will be
valued. The basic rate for services of counsel and administrative personnel is "the
hourly rate most commonly billed by the attorney for similar services at the time such
services were provided." If the attorney has no hourly billing rate, the court will use
"the hourly fair market value for similar services provided by those with similar experi-
ence, professional background, reputation, and skill in the community" where the
attorney is located.
Sections 3027(c)-(d) provide for certain accelerated hourly rates in certain high
risk situations. Under § 3027(c) the § 3027(b) rate is increased for risk:
(1) by multiplying that -rate by up to 1.75 in any action in which the
attorney relied to a substantial extent upon a judgment, upon the product
of a civil action, or upon the product of an investigation, grand jury proceed-
ing, or criminal prosecution conducted by a State or by the United States;
or
(2) in any other action, by multiplying that rate-
(A) by no less than 2 and no more than 3 if the time spent occurred
prior to the conclusion of the preliminary hearing; or
(B) by no less than 1.75 and no more than 2.5 if the time spent oc-
curred after the conclusion of the preliminary hearing.
Section 3027(d) states that the increases in 3027(c) are the sole and exclusive
increases under the bill. Also, § 3027(d) states that § 3027(c) does not apply to time
spent on the attorney's fees issue or on settlement administration.
Finally, § 3027(e) names two situations in which the court must reduce the award.
First, the court must reduce the award in order to ensure that the compensation
received by counsel from all sources does not exceed the amount calculated under §
3027. Second, if the court finds the award calculated under § 3027 too large in relation
to the total recovery, if any, then the court may reduce the award to a more reasonable
amount.
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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68
also contains provisions aimed at preventing unreasonable
delay in class actions, including the imposition of a specific
timetable for judicial action. 40
II. MANAGEABILITY UNDER SENATE BILL 3475
The concept of manageability in Rule 23(b)(3) actions is
centered in subsection 23(b)(3)(D).4 ' That subsection requires
that the court consider possible management problems in de-
ciding whether the class action is superior to alternative reme-
dies." Primarily, manageability objections are based on the
size of the class, the difficulties associated with notice to the
class and the problems in computing and distributing dam-
ages.43
A. Class Size and Manageability
Large class size in itself is seldom identified as the primary
basis for dismissing a class action;" even in exceptional cases,
one suspects that other factors are behind the conclusion that
the class is too large. 5 The usual large class action is a mass
consumer action in which the individual claims are small and
widespread, but the defendant's unlawful profits are large.
1o Id. § 3024 (provides a process by which the court will assume a litigation timeta-
ble to govern the course of the case); Id. § 3025 (enables the Judicial Conference of
the United States to fix time limits within which the court must make rulings and file
opinions, and if a delay occurs the judicial council must be notified of the reasons
therefore, and may provide assistance to the court to resolve it).
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (amended 1966).
42 Id.
1 Partain v. First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery, 59 F.R.D. 56, 61 (M.D. Ala. 1973);
Note, supra note 11, at 901 (manageability is a combination of notice and damage
distribution).
" In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 73 F.R.D. 322, 335 (1976) ("[Tjhere
is no need to state the exact number and identity of every class member because to
do so would frustrate the purpose of class actions when recoveries may be numerous
but small."); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 599 (M.D. Ill. 1973); In
re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (ill-gotten
gains are not to become "a 'pot of gold' inaccessible to the mulcted consumers because
they are many and their individual claims small."); Freeman, Current Issues in Class
Action Litigation, 70 F.R.D. 251, 260 (1976).
11 E.g., Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 599 (M.D. Ill. 1973), in
which the court noted that no case had ever certified a class of the size involved (30 to
40 million). However, the major concern of the court was the difficulty of providing
notice and compiling the materials necessary for determination of individual damages.
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Often the individual claim is so small that administrative costs
of the suit threaten to eat up most of an individual's award.'6
As a consequence, only the attorney for the class benefits from
the action, and some courts have found this result intolerable. 47
While Federal Rule 23(b)(3) requires courts to remain sensitive
to the interests of individual class members," this is often an
impossible task in a mass consumer action. Moreover, if any
individual questions do arise, courts are faced with the possi-
bility of individual mini-trials of such issues." Finally, the
problems inherent in all class actions-notice and computation
of damages-grow in magnitude as the size of the class in-
creases.50
1. Balancing of Individual Interests: The Public Action/Class
Compensatory Dichotomy
Beyond reduction of the scope of the class and creation of
subclasses, the present Rule 23 offers a few real guidelines
aimed at resolving the conflict between the need for class ac-
tion lawsuits and the interests of individual class members.5'
Thus, since the judicial system is geared to the resolution of
" In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 91 (9th Cir. 1974).
'T Id.; Simon, supra note 11, at 377.
" The court must find that "the questions of law or fact common to the merfibers
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members
... . " FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) (amended 1966). Also, one factor pertinent to the
consideration of the superiority of a class action is "the interest of members of the class
in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions .... "FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A) (amended 1966).
"' In re Memorex Security Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 103 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Boshes v.
General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 600 (M.D. Ill. 1973) (individual trial of damages
issues); Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, 61 F.R.D. 427, 432 (W.D. Mo. 1973). The alterna-
tive to having individual mini-trials of such issues may be to alter substantive rights.
See Simon, supra note 11, at 381.83. An example of this type of alteration of substan-
tive law may be found in In re Memorex Security Cases, 61 F.R.D. at 95-96. There the
issue concerned misrepresentations made to defendant's shareholders. The court recog-
nized that in most cases many different misrepresentations would be involved, but
concluded that that consideration would not render this action too individual. The
court ruled that where there is a "common nucleus" within the several misrepresen-
tations the common issue predominates over the individual issues.
11 See notes 78-113 and 138-45 and accompanying text infra for a detailed discus-
sion of the manageability problems associated with notice and damages.
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) (amended 1966). See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 179 n.16, 180-82 (1974) (Douglas, J.1 concurring).
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individual rights, there is something of an institutional preju-
dice toward very large class actions.52 In the context of the mass
consumer action, where the claims are too small for individual
actions, the present Rule can result in absolute denial of re-
lief.3
The drafters of Senate Bill 3475 recognized that a class
action in which the class is very large and the claims are small
cannot be resolved in the same manner as an action involving
a moderate sized class with significant individual claims; 4 the
public action/class compensatory action dichotomy evidences
this recognition.5 The bill provides substantially different
mechanisms for each type of action, and these mechanisms are
based on legislative judgments regarding the primary interests
behind each type of class action."
The proposed class action legislation recognizes that the
weight accorded individual interest in controlling the litigation
varies with the facts of the case. The public action, where the
class is large and the claims small, represents the case where
individual interest is at its nadir and compensation is a second-
ary consideration.57 Here, the Rule 23 mechanisms designed to
protect individual interests are not only cumbersome, but may
be destructive. 58 Clearly, the public action" presumption that
individual interests are so slight as to require almost no consid-
eration is reasonable where the possibility of individual suits
12 Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of
America, 23 BuFFALo L. REv. 343, 405-06 (1973-74).
0 Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1968); Illinois
v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 489 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
' 124 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at 14502.
"Id. at 14502-03.
Id. at 14502.
" Id. at 14503; Homburger, supra note 52, at 409 ("Plaintiff [class representa-
tive] is not so much interested in the rights of the individuals whom he purports to
represent, as in the rights of the group as such.").
I See note 53, supra for cases discussing the fact that dismissal of a class action
often results in closing the door on any recovery at all. There is, however, some dispute
as to whether this denial of a remedy is actually destructive. See Handler, The Shift
From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Review, 71 COLUmi. L. REv.
1, 10-11 (1971) and Simon, supra note 11, at 377, in which the commentators argue
that, from a broader perspective, it is more destructive to permit such suits to burden
the federal courts. They argue that no social purpose is served by encouraging suits
which otherwise would not be brought.
[Vol. 68
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is virtually non-existent 5' On the other hand, the class com-
pensatory action exists for the situations in which individual
interests are typically more important.
2. Additional Goals of Class Actions: The Dichotomy
Approach
In addition to preserving realistic individual interests of
class members, the division between public and class compen-
satory actions also facilitates the attainment of other specific
types of goals. The goals of class actions have been described
as: 1) compensation of the named plaintiff; 2) compensation of
unnamed plaintiffs; 3) prevention of unjust enrichment of the
defendant; and 4) deterrence of wrongdoers."' The relative
importance of each goal obviously varies with the facts of the
case.' Moreover, different procedural mechanisms are required
to maximize the satisfaction of a particular goal.
In a class compensatory action the class members have a
significant stake in the litigation by virtue of the appreciable
size of the individual claims. 2 Thus, the goal of compensating
all the plaintiffs is paramount; 3 the goals of deterrence and
prevention of unjust enrichment, while still extant, are not as
important.
Conversely, a public action is characterized by a large
class with small individual claims." However, while the indi-
vidual claims are small, the aggregate damage for the injured
class is quite large."5 Thus, in these cases, the profit to the
wrongdoer is great, but the individual incentive to challenge
the wrongdoer is miniscule. In that situation the goals of de-
terrence and prevention of unjust enrichment are most signifi-
9 Freeman, supra note 44, at 260; Schuck & Cohen, The Consumer Class Action:
An Endangered Species, 12 SAN Dmo L. REv. 39, 68 (1974).
60 Comment, Class Actions and the Need for Legislative Reappraisal, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 285, 295 (1974).
, Note, supra note 11, at 920-22.
2 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. B, § 3011(a)(1) (individual claims
exceed $300).
8 124 CoNG. REc., supra note 5, at 14506.
8 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3001(a)(1) (1978) (200 or
more injured persons with individual damages below $300).
1 Id. § 3001(a)(2) (aggregate exceeds $60,000).
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cant;6" in such cases an inordinate emphasis on the compensa-
tory function would hinder the vindication of society's interest
in the enforcement of its laws.1
7
On a practical level, Senate Bill 3475 provides different
procedural devices for each type of action; these devices are
sensitive to the class size involved, the size of the claim in-
volved, the individual interest in control of the litigation and
the goals served by the action. In a class compensatory action
the emphasis is on the protection of individual interests in
controlling the litigation and the promotion of compensatory
goals." The paramount concern is achieving judicial efficiency
through the class action without sacrificing individual inter-
ests; 9 consequently, a proper class representative retains con-
trol of the suit.7 0 Individual interests are safeguarded by provi-
sions which allow some or all members of the class to opt out
or some or all of the members to opt in, as the court in its
discretion may decide.7
Because it significantly affects substantive rights, the pub-
lic action must be viewed as more than a procedural innova-
tion. As previously mentioned, liability in the public action is
to the United States and not to the injured class members.
7 2
The primary goals are deterrence and the disgorging of ill-
gotten gains; thus the Attorney General may maintain control
of the action73 and must dispose of it consistently with the
public interest.74 There are no opt-out or opt-in procedures to
protect individual interests 75 and intervention by a class mem-
ber is specifically denied.7 1 Clearly, the public action is a public
enforcement mechanism which merely utilizes the private bar
to discover and bring wrongful conduct to the government's
16 124 CONG. REC., supra note 5, at 14503.
17 Id.; Comment, supra note 60, at 295-96.
Is 124 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at 14502, 14506.
6' Id.
o Id. at 14506 ("There must also be a representative party who, with counsel,
adequately represents the class interests.").
71 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. B. § 3013(e)(1)-(2) (1978).
12 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A., § 3001(a) (1978).
13 Id. § 3002(b)(1).
7' Id. § 3002(b)(4).
7 124 CONG. REC., supra note 5, at 14505.
7 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3001(C) (1978).
[Vol. 68
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attention.77 As such, the bill provides a procedure for redress
of consumer grievances where essentially none existed before.
B. The Notice Problem
The second management problem inherent in class action
lawsuits is determining what constitutes adequate notice of the
action to absent class members. Since the burden of providing
such notice is on the class representative, a determination of
adequacy may be crucial for the maintenance of the action; if
notice is costly the representative party may be unwilling or
unable to bear the expense. The notice problem becomes espe-
cially acute in light of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"8 in which
the Supreme Court strictly construed Rule 23(c)(2) to require
"individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort"79 in 23(b)(3) class actions.'" Eisen
represents a rather mechanistic application of the Rule 23(c) (2)
notice requirement; such an approach treats notice as though
it is an end in itself.8' Conversely, Senate Bill 3475 takes a more
flexible approach to the notice requirement and can best be
justified by an analysis of the goals served by notice.
11 124 CONG. REC., supra note 5, at 14504.
7A 417 U.S. 156 (1974). For discussion of the issues and problems which arose in
the course of the Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin litigation, see Benett, Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin: Supreme Court Calls for Revamping of Class Action Strategy, 1974 Wis.
L. REv. 801; Ceiner, Class Actions: The Legal Odyssey of Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin,
5 MEAM. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1974); Duesenberg, Class Actions and Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 31 Mo. B.J. 189 (1975); Hauser, The Class Action Struggle Continues: The
Problems Eisen Ignored, 44 A.B.A. ANTrrmuST L.J. 75 (1975); Shapiro & Springer,
Management of Consumer Class Actions After Eisen: Notice and Determination of
Damages, 26 MERCER L. REv. 851 (1975); Note, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin-Fluid
Recovery Minihearings and Notice in Class Actions, 54 B.U. L. REv. 111 (1974); Note,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin: Rejection of the 23(b)(3) Class Action as a Social
Remedy, 10 Wn.LmrmTE L.J. 127 (1973); Note, Managing the Large Class Action:
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REv. 426 (1973); Note, The Manageability
Crisis of Consumer Class Actions: The Severe Example of Eisen HI, 7 IND. L. REv. 361
(1973); Comment, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin-Fluid Class Recovery and Notice
Requirements in Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions-a Strict Approach, 1973 UTAH L. REv.
489.
7' FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(c)(2) (amended 1966).
417 U.S. at 173. Moreover, the Court defined "reasonable effort" in a manner
which referred to the physical effort involved in locating the absent parties without
considering cost as a mitigating factor. Id. at 176.
1' Comment, supra note 60, at 294.
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1. Res Judicata
The underlying source of the entire notice controversy in-
volves the concept of res judicata.8 2 In the older version of Rule
23, the "spurious" class action was not automatically res judi-
cata on absent members.0 To be bound by the judgment the
absent class member would have to opt in, or, in other words,
directly acknowledge the power of the class representative to
litigate his rights." Under this scheme notice served only to
bring more individuals into the suit. Under the present version
of Rule 23, the most significant innovation was the expansion
of the res judicata effect in 23(b)(3) actions, which replaced the
"spurious" action.85 Now the only way for a class member to
avoid res judicata is to opt out of the action in a timely man-
ner.86 This procedure serves both the interest of the courts and
the defendant, because the common issues need only be liti-
gated once.8" Moreover, such an approach aids the class repre-
sentative by giving him more clout vis-d-vis the defendant."
Senate Bill 3475 provides for res judicata in both the pub-
lic and class compensatory actions." In a public action res
judicata is virtually absolute." In a class compensatory action
res judicata is the general rule,9" although there are exceptions
in the form of opt-out and opt-in provisions, which may be used
in the court's discretion.
2
2. Due Process: Adequacy of Representation
Clearly it is in the interest of both parties to the suit to
ensure res judicata, 3 and the class action would lose its useful-
82 Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 97, 117.
3B F. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAncICE 23.30 (2d ed. 1978).
8Id.
Id. § 23.45. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(3) (amended 1966).
88 3B F. MooRE, supra note 83, at § 23.60. See Fan. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B), 23(c)(3)
(amended 1966).
u Dam, supra note 82, at 118.
88 Id.
88 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. C, § 3023 (1978).
'o Id. § 3023(a).
" Id. § 3023(b).
82 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. B, § 3013(e)(1)-(2) (1978).
83 See notes 87-88 supra for authority relating to the plaintiffs and the defendant's
interests in res judicata.
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ness as a device for judicial efficiency if it became too suscepti-
ble to collateral attack. However, courts must determine that
minimum due process requirements are met in order to pro-
perly and justly bind absent class members to the judgment. 4
This due process requirement presents a definitional problem:
exactly what is "due process" in a class action? Due process is
most fundamentally defined as an opportunity to be heard;
9 5
therefore, notice is important only insofar as it is an effective
tool for ensuring a fair hearing." A citizen would get little con-
solation from a right to notice if a right to present his interests
at an impartial hearing did not follow. While the notion of a
class action is founded on the assumption that all members of
the class will not appear at the trial, the due process require-
ment of an opportunity to be heard is not entirely abandoned.
The crucial concept in a fair hearing in a class action is repre-
sentation by an individual or a few class members of the inter-
ests of the entire class." Thus, since a fair hearing in a class
suit is contingent on representation, it follows that notice must
be designed to maximize the adequacy of the representation."
This role is different from the one played by notice in an adver-
sarial context. In the adversary context notice is a jurisdic-
tional due process concept. 9 Factors, such as the possibility of
a default judgment, necessitate sufficient individual notice."0
However, in a class action the party is already before the court
in the person of the class representative and the possibility of
default is non-existent. 01 Notice is merely a procedural due
process issue designed solely to guarantee adequate representa-
tion of the class.
02
In Eisen the Court based the requirement of individual
notice on a strict reading of 23(c)(2).1°1 Both the Eisen opinion
1, Note, Class Action Judgments and Mutuality of Estoppel, 43 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 814, 828-29 (1974-75).
11 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
11 Id.; see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) (Notice must be "reasonably calculated. . . to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.").
', Note, supra note 94, at 827-28.
9' Id. at 828; Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Require-
ments in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. Rev. 1217, 1231 (1975).
92 Homburger, supra note 52, at 364.
1c3 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
11 417 U.S. at 175.
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and the Advisory Committee Notes to 23(c)(2) suggest that
such notice is a due process requirement.' 4 The authority for
this position is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.,' 5 in which the Court ruled that due process required a
bank seeking a judicial settlement of accounts in a trust to send
individual notice to all known beneficiaries of the trust.
Mullane is factually inapposite to the class action situation,
because in that case the interests of the bank were opposed to
those of the "class" of beneficiaries; ' adequacy of representa-
tion was clearly not the issue. Moreover, even in Mullane the
Court outlined a very flexible notion of due process in such
cases; the Court advocated an approach that would give "due
regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case."'0 u7 In
addition, the Court gave some inkling of the characteristics of
class action notice when it noted that "notice reasonably cer-
tain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to
safeguard the interests of all. . . . We think that under such
circumstances reasonable risks that notice might not actually
reach every beneficiary are justifiable.' 0I s The district court in
Eisen expounded this type of approach to the notice require-
ment' 9 only to be overruled by the Supreme Court."0
'0 Id. at 173-74. The Court noted that the Advisory Committee's Note suggested
that individual notice is a constitutional requirement. Advisory Committee's Note,
Proposed Rules of Civ. roc., 39 F.R.D. 69, 106-07 (1965).
1- 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
116 Homburger, supra note 52, at 364; Comment, Amending Rule 23 in Response
to Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 53 N.C.L. REv. 409, 414-15 (1974).
107 339 U.S. at 314. See Note, supra note 10, at 801-02. Comment, supra note 60,
at 293-94.
339 U.S. at 319.
'0' Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 265-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Rather
than sending individual notice to the 2,000,000 identifiable class members, the court
approved a three-tiered approach to notice. First, the plaintiff would give a form of
indirect notice by sending "individual notice to all member firms of the NYSE and to
all commercial banks with large trust departments .... " Second, individual notice
would be sent to the approximately 2,000 class members with ten or more stock trans-
actions during the period covered by the suit. In addition, individual notice would be
mailed to 5,000 class members picked at random. Finally, notice by publication in
various newspapers would supplement the other notice. The court felt this type of
approach would satisfy the standard established in Mullane. See also West Virginia
v. Chs. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir. 1971), in which the court approved
notice by publication in an action where states were the class representatives. The
court outlined a very flexible standard for due process in notice issues.
110 417 U.S. at 172-73.
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The case most often cited by commentators on the issue
of class action notice is Hansberry v. Lee."' In Hansberry, the
Court was dealing with a collateral attack on a prior class ac-
tion brought to seek enforcement of a restrictive covenant.12 In
that case the Court discussed due process, not in terms of indi-
vidual notice, but in terms of assuring adequacy of representa-
tion.
It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a
class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by
the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented
by parties who are present ....
In all such cases, so far as it can be said that members
of the class who are present are, by generally recognized rules
of law, entitled to stand in judgment for those who are not,
we may assume for present purposes that such procedure
affords a protection to the parties who are represented,
though absent, which would satisfy the requirements of due
process and full faith and credit."3
Thus, it is a fundamental error to approach due process by a
mechanical application of notice requirements when adequacy
of representation is the true issue.
3. The Approach of Senate Bill 3475: Adequate
Representation
Adequacy of representation is the foundation for notice in
Senate Bill 3475. The basic notice provision requires the court
to "give notice reasonably necessary to assure adequacy of rep-
resentation of all persons included in the class and fairness to
all such persons."'' Thus, while notice is still viewed as an
excellent tool for ensuring adequate representation," 5 at least
in class compensatory actions, notice is not equated with due
"' 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
' Id. at 37-40.
" Id. at 42-43. See also Dam, supra note 82, at 111-12; Jacoby & Cherkasky, The
Effects of Eisen IV and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rule 23, 12 SAN DIEGo L.
Rav. 1, 15-16 (1974); Comment, supra note 98, at 1230-31.
M' S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. B, § 3013(3).
M See Note, supra note 94, at 835; Comment, supra note 98, at 1231.
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process as appears to be the case in the Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 23.111
Pre-trial notice is not required in a public action."' In
these suits the individual interests of class members are sec-
ondary and the primary focus is on the government's interest
in enforcement of its laws. "8 This substantive change in focus
centers the issue of adequacy of representation around the pub-
lic interests in the action-deterrence and prevention of unjust
enrichment. These concerns are not left to a class representa-
tive and his attorney; rather, the United States Attorney Gen-
eral may take control of the action and determine who will
pursue it."' As the circumstances require, the Attorney General
may assume control of the suit,' delegate control of the action
to an appropriate state,121 or allow the class representative to
continue to handle the action. 2 Furthermore, the Attorney
General may decide whether to continue or withdraw the
suit, 121 and in order to overcome a decision to withdraw the suit
the class representative must show that the public interest will
be served by the action. 24 In addition, any settlement must be
approved by the Attorney General and the court.'1 Finally, if
the Attorney General allows the suit to continue as a class
"I The Advisory Committee's Note refers to Rules 23(c)(2) and (d)(2) as being
consistent with due process requirements, citing, inter alia, Mullane and Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). This reference would appear to put primary emphasis on
notice as satisfying due process, without a great emphasis on adequacy of representa-
tion. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 104, at 106-07.
,17 124 CONG. REC., supra note 5, at 14504.
,, Id. at 14503.
", S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3002(b)(1)-(4). An exception
to this rule is where the public action is institued by a relator for injuries caused by
the United States itself. Id. § 3001(e)(1)-(3).
I- Id. § 3002(b)(1).
121 Id. § 3002(b)(3)(A)-(C). When the state is delegated the action it has options
similar to those first available to the Attorney General. The state may assume control
of the action, allow the class representative to control it or file a statement with the
court stating reasons why the action would not be in the public interest, which would
result in dismissal unless the relator can convince the court that the public interest
would be served by the action.
I- Id. § 3002(b)(2).
123 Id. § 3002(b)(4).
124 Id.
121 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. C, § 3026(b) (1978).
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action with the class representative in control, an incentive fee
is provided for the successful class representative.'28 This fee
provision is designed to encourage the representative party to
retain some control of the suit and to keep the attorney from
becoming too independent in the prosecution of the action.',
The class compensatory action represents the more typical
class action approach. Adequacy of representation in this ac-
tion focuses on representation of the interests of the class mem-
bers and assuring the class members a fair hearing via the class
representative; pre-trial notice may therefore be required.,"
The court is given discretion to determine the type of notice
necessary to ensure adequate representation of the class mem-
bers.'29 Moreover, in determining the extent of the class to be
represented, the court may designate certain parties who must
either opt out to be excluded from the class or opt in to be
included in the class. 3' The standards for making such a deter-
mination are, inter alia, the feasibility of those class members
pursuing individual claims and the likelihood that they have
the sophistication to do so.131 With these procedures the court
can ensure adequate representation by giving some members of
the class the opportunity to determine for themselves the ade-
quacy of the class representative.
13
Senate Bill 3475 also supplies the courts with other tools
necessary to prevent erosion of adequate representation. The
,15 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., see. 2(a), subch. A, § 3005(a)(2) (1978).
'27 124 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at 14505. See Simon, supra note 11, at 391-94,
for a long discussion of the problems which arise because of the independent entrepre-
neur status a lawyer attains in the typical class action. The incentive fee is designed
to encourage the class representative to maintain some control over the action and his
lawyer.
This approach is not as innovative as may first appear. The value ofparens patriae
suits (see 124 Cong. Rec., supra note 5, at 14503, for a discussion regarding the use of
the parens-patriae device in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976) and class actions prosecuted by states have been recognized in other contexts.
See, e.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"I' S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. 1B, § 3013(3) (1978). 124 CONG.
REc., supra note 5, at 14506.
'2 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. B., § 3013(e) (1978).
120 Id.
131 Id.
"32 124 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at 14506. The commentary notes that only per-
sons with a claim of $10,000 or more or with an unusual claim or defense should get
the benefit of the opt-in procedure.
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class representative and his attorney must submit affidavits
showing the representative's common interests with the class
and the extent of the attorney's experience with complex litiga-
tion.'1' The court may require other pertinent information and
may hold written or oral argument to aid in the determination
of adequate representation.'34 In addition, all settlements are
subject to judicial scrutiny to guarantee that the interests of
the class as a whole are not prejudiced by the representative.'3
Finally, the bill provides very strict guidelines for calculating
attorney's fees.'36 The control of attorney's fees is designed to
make the attorney less of a private entrepreneur and to mini-
mize potential conflicts of interest between the attorney and
the class.'
37
C. Manageability and the Damage Process
The final management problem concerns the damages pro-
cess. Problems arise in two stages of this process: 1) the compu-
tation of damages and 2) the distribution of damages to the
individual members of the class.
1. Inherent Problems in Individual Proof of Damages
Most courts consider the issue of damages to be an individ-
ual question even in the class action context; under this ap-
proach the sum of the defendant's liability is deemed to be the
aggregate of individual damages, and each plaintiff is individu-
ally responsible for proving the extent of his injury.'1s This
approach has resulted in management problems at both stages
of the damages process.
At the calculation stage, the court could be overwhelmed
with individual hearings because the extent of the defendant's
11 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. C, § 3022(a)(l)-(2) (1978). See
also 124 CONG. REC., supra note 4, at 14507.
"3 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. C, § 3022(a)(3) & (b) (1978).
" Id. § 3026(a).
236 Id. § 3027(a)-(e).
"3 See Simon, supra note 11, at 391-94, for a discussion of the possible problems
of conflict of interest between the class and its attorney.
'' In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 88-89, 92 (9th Cir. 1974); Ralston
v. Volkswagenwerk, 61 F.R.D. 427, 432-33 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
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liability is determined by the sum of the individual claims.' 3
Since the defendant probably would take issue with each
claim, the time required to perform this task would be enor-
mous. 40 Moreover, in many cases the plaintiff will have insuffi-
cient records of his own to establish a claim in an adversary
setting;' thus, injured plaintiffs could go uncompensated and
in such situations the defendant would be allowed to keep a
portion of his ill-gotten gains.
During the distribution stage, even if an aggregate recov-
ery were established, the extensive time required for proof
could still pose a problem. In some cases administrative costs
could eat away smaller recoveries, thus prompting the court to
declare the action unmanageable for failing to fulfill the com-
pensatory function.4 2 Also, unclaimed damages could leave a
large fund in the hands of a court which might be ill equipped
to handle such a fund;13 since fluid class recoveries are gener-
ally disfavored, the court cannot give this fund to the next best
class without risking accusation of enhancing the rights of
non-class members at the expense of uncompensated class
members.' 4 Finally, damage questions are often so intertwined
with substantive issues that class action treatment may be
inadequate.' 4
2. The Flexible Approach of Senate.Bill 3475
In light of these potentially crippling problems in the dam-
ages process under present Rule 23, it is clear that the proposed
"1' 500 F.2d at 89. (The court concluded that holding individual hearings would
be too burdensome.); Inre Memorex Security Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 103 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(The court recognized the difficulty of the task, but held tkat such hearings were
necessary if the defendant were to be found liable.); Boshes v. General Motors Corp.,
59 F.R.D. 589, 600 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
"I See, Note, supra note 11, at 919; Comment, Due Process and Fluid Class
Recovery, 53 OR. L. REv. 225, 236-37 (1974). Here the authors take issue with the notion
that the defendant has the right to confront each individual plaintiff.
"' E.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72 (D.N.J. 1971).
142 E.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1974).
"I Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1973) (The court
referred to the problem of disposing of the leftover fund as "troublesome.").
'" E.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72 (D.N.J. 1971).
See also Comment, supra note 140, at 237.
"I Simon, supra note 11, at 382-84.
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class action legislation must have provisions for the effective
and expedient computation and distribution of damages. The
approach embodied in Senate Bill 3475 is more flexible than
the current approach, which concentrates on individualized
procedures. The new bill takes a twofold approach which is: 1)
contingent on the underlying policy objectives of the particular
class action device involved and 2) sensitive to the types of
circumstances and resources typically involved in a class action
suit.
a. The Public Action
As stated throughout, the goals in a public action are de-
terrence and prevention of unjust enrichment. Consistent with
this policy, damages are based on the total profit resulting from
the defendant's wrongful conduct or the total damage caused
to the class as a whole.146 Separate proof of individual injury is
not required.' 4 Instead, the aggregate amount is determined by
"any reasonable means of ascertaining benefit, profit, or dam-
age . .. "148 This approach would seem to free the court to
utilize any reasonable evidence of aggregate damages at its
disposal.149
Distribution of damages in a public action also reflects the
twofold approach to the damage process. The defendant must
pay the entire aggregate amount to the court clerk who then
transfers it to the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts for distribution to the class by that office's Director. 10
Any surplus remaining after distribution is not returned to the
defendant; instead it is used to pay claims in other actions in
'" S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3006(b)(1)-(2) (1978).
147 Id. § 3006(c). The court may, however, take a sampling of injured persons to
aid measurement of class damages. 124 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at 14505.
14 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3006(c) (1978).
"' There is authority which suggests that use of the defendants' business records
or even computer models may be proper for determining aggregate damages. See, e.g.,
In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 73 F.R.D. 322, 351-54 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (The
court discussed the use of statistical and polling methods, defendant's business re-
cords, and computer techniques.); Barr v. WUI/TAS Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 115 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (The court discussed the use of time sheets kept by defendant in the course of
his business with plaintiffs.); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 289
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (The court discussed the use of statistics and computer models).
110 -S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3006(e) (1978).
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which the fund may be depleted,"' and ultimately reverts to
the United States Treasury. ' -2 Therefore, the defendant keeps
none of his ill-gotten gains. Since the Director is charged with
the responsibility of distribution of the fund, he must establish
standards by which claims will be judged and honored or de-
nied. 5' In fact, the Director has the discretion to design a pay-
ment procedure which is "reasonably accurate" without requir-
ing the 'submission of claims. 54 The court itself gets involved
in this process only if an extraordinary dispute arises between
the Director and a claimant to the fund. 15 By this design, the
bill maximizes the use of available resources in a public ac-
tion."'
b. The Class Compensatory Action: Shift in the Burden of
Proof
The class compensatory action focuses on individual com-
pensation, and the damages procedure reflects this concern.
The court may bifurcate the trial by splitting the damage de-
termination from the trial of substantive questions of liabil-
ity;" the only limitation, of course, is that the constitutional
rights of the parties may not be violated."' Consistent with the
compensatory thrust of the action, the calculation of damages
is based on the individual injuries."' However, the evidence
regarding the amount of individual damages need not be
brought forward by the plaintiffs. The defendant has the duty
to make an effort to ascertain the identity of the injured parties
and the extent of individual damages from the defendant's
records or "other reasonably available sources."' 60 This require-
"' Id. § 3007(e)(2).
' Id. § 3007(a) (This reversion occurs three years after date of deposit.)
1'5 Id. § 3007(b). See generally 124 CoNG. REc., supra note 5, at 14505.
I'" S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. A, § 3007(c) (1978).
1'5 Id. § 3007(d) (When the Director suspects fraud or other lack of basis he may
refuse to pay the claim, and file his reasons therefor with the clerk of the court.)
Ir, Id. § 3007(b) & (e)(2).
'5' S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(a), subch. B, § 3014(b) (1978).
I'S Id.
"' "The amount of injury to each person who remains in or enters a class compen-
satory action shall be proven by any method permitted or required by law." Id. §
3014(a) (emphasis added).
"I Id. § 3014(c)(1).
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ment comports with the reality that the best sources of proof
of damages often are at the disposal of the defendant. At the
distribution stage the defendant must give notice of his liabil-
ity to the persons discovered from his records'6 ' and any addi-
tional notice designed to inform other possible class members
of liability. 62 Again, this approach reflects a concern for effec-
tive use of available resources, since the defendant found liable
at trial is in a better position to handle such extensive notice
than is the class representative.
The bill's approach to damages, therefore, reveals a sensi-
tivity for the resources available in a class action, rather than
a mechanistic attachment to individual proof of damages.
However, this is not entirely a procedural change; rather, the
approach represents a substantive shift in the burden of proof
of damages to the defendant.
6 3
CONCLUSION
Generally speaking, Senate Bill 3475 provides valuable
tools for management of class actions, and effectively reopens
the doors of the federal courts to mass consumer class actions.
As it treats the manageability issue, the bill is effective in
providing innovative procedures and using devices developed
by certain imaginative courts. This effectiveness does not, how-
ever, end Congressional consideration of the value and the mer-
its of the bill. Despite the improvement of judicial manage-
ment of class actions, the bill will still.significantly increase the
workload of federal courts.' 4 Congress must make a policy de-
termination of whether these class actions are worth a possible
increase in the docket backlogs in federal courts.'6 5 Moreover,
despite protestations to the contrary, the bill significantly al-
,l, Id. § 3014(c)(2).
,62 Id. § 3014(c)(3).
'6 This shifting of the burden of proof of damages is not entirely without prece-
dent. For instance, certain tort law concepts shift the burden of proof to the defendants
in situations where the plaintiff proves that one of the multiple defendants is liable,
but he cannot prove which one. The burden is then shifted to each defendant to prove
his nonliability. See generally Homburger, supra note 52, at 373.
6 See Burger, Has the Time Come? 55 F.R.D. 119 (1972), for a general discussion
of the problem of the enormous case load in the federal judiciary.
"I Handler, supra note 58, at 10-11.
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ters substantive rights as well as procedural devices. Thus, the
possible effect of these alterations on the ability of a defendant
to properly defend the action must be carefuly weighed. Fi-
nally, the proposed legislation may inadequately deal with the
problems of strike suits and blackmail settlements. 66 Although
some safeguards, such as Attorney General and court control
of settlements and preliminary hearings on the merits of ac-
tions, are provided, 6 ' Congress must evenhandedly consider
whether improved procedures for bringing and managing class
actions will operate at the expense of defendants whose guilt
is in doubt.
James R. Lyons, Jr.
, Id. at 9; Simon, supra note 11, at 388-90.
, 124 CONG. REC., supra note 5, at 14504-05, 14507.
